

CIA-DIA Bomb Damage Monthly

25X1 6 Dec 67 [ ] to DDI memo re Improvement of the DIA-CIA  
Monthly on Effects of Bombing

25X1 10 Jan 68 [ ] Memo for File re CIA/DIA Joint BDA Monthly  
(DDI/DD/ER/General Taylor meeting to discuss  
BDA report; Taylor's dissatisfaction with the  
report and his and the military's wish to  
discontinue it).

25X1 11 Jan 68 Distribution List for An Appraisal of the Bombing of  
North Vietnam (Prepared jointly by CIA & DIA)

25X1 17 Jan 68 [ ] to DDI [ ] Short Memo re Joint DIA-CIA BDA  
Report (discussing restricting distribution of  
report)

No Date Admiral Sharp cable re CIA/DIA report, An Appraisal  
of the Bombing of North Vietnam (uncomplimentary  
critique)

Attachments: Proposed response to CINCPAC, no date,  
responding to Sharp's cable

DIA memo, no date, responding to Sharp's  
cable

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Approved For Release 2006/10/05 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600090001-3

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<b>Remarks:</b> <div style="display: flex; align-items: flex-start;"> <div style="flex: 1;"> <p>Here is Sharp's cable</p> <p>re: CIA/DIA monthly and various draft replies. I'm not certain what reply finally went to CINCOSAC.</p> <p>We are not supposed to be aware of this exchange.</p> </div> <div style="flex: 0.5; border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 40px; margin-left: 10px;"></div> </div>			
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SUBJECT: Approved For Release 2006/10/05 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000600090001-3  
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF  
NORTH VIETNAM (U)

1. I AGREE THAT THE CIA-DIA APPRAISAL CAN BE IMPROVED AND APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS IN THIS REGARD. AS YOU KNOW, THE REQUIREMENT FOR THIS MONTHLY REPORT WAS LEVIED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THE FORMAT AND CONTENTS WERE PRIMARILY DEVELOPED IN ACCORDANCE WITH HIS DESIRES.

2. IN RECENT WEEKS, DIA AND CIA HAVE BEEN REASSESSING THE DOCUMENT IN ORDER TO MAKE IT MORE MEANINGFUL; CERTAIN ACTIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN TAKEN. THE MAJOR CHANGE CALLS FOR A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION BEGINNING IN MARCH. SUCH A TIME SPAN SHOULD PERMIT MORE ACCURATE AND COMPREHENSIVE TREND ANALYSIS IN ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF THE BOMBING CAMPAIGN.

3. IN RESPECT TO YOUR SPECIFIC COMMENTS, THE OBJECTIVES AND CONSTRAINTS WILL BE INCORPORATED. I AGREE THAT THE TABLES ARE LESS THAN COMPLETE, AND STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN TO MODIFY THEM. THE DATA ON VEHICLE ATTRITION IN THE DECEMBER ISSUE WHICH YOU CITED REFLECTED ADJUSTED DESTRUCTION FIGURES BASED ON FACTORS OF 75 PER CENT FOR THOSE REPORTED DESTROYED AND 25 PER CENT FOR THOSE REPORTED DAMAGED IN OPREP-46. FRANKLY, VEHICLE ATTRITION CALCULATIONS HAVE PROVEN TROUBLESOME. THE RESOLUTION OF DIFFERENCES HAS NOT ALWAYS BEEN

POSSIBLE ON A MONTHLY BASIS, BECAUSE OF THE PUBLICATION SCHEDULE. THE SWITCH TO A QUARTERLY PUBLICATION SHOULD PERMIT THE RESOLUTION OF SUCH DIFFICULTIES IN THE FUTURE.

4. THE APPRAISAL DOES NOT ADDRESS EITHER THE IMPACT OF ROLLING THUNDER OR USSR-CHICOM RELATIONSHIPS OR ANY "WHAT IF" POSSIBILITIES. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT CAN, BECAUSE OF THE IMPOUNDERABLES INVOLVED. MANPOWER DIVERSIONS HAVE BEEN FIRMLY ESTABLISHED BUT NOT DISCUSSED EACH MONTH. THE PROBLEM OF RELATING THE RESIDUAL MANPOWER TO REQUIRED TASKS AND SUPPORT OF THE MILITARY FORCES IS BEYOND THE CAPABILITIES OF THE INFORMATION CURRENTLY AVAILABLE.

5. I SHARE YOUR CONCERN ON THE NEED TO DEVELOP A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR AIR EFFORTS IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE CHANGES NOW UNDER WAY WILL INCORPORATE SOME OF YOUR VIEWS AND HOPEFULLY WILL PLACE THE IMPACT OF THE ROLLING THUNDER PROGRAM IN BETTER PERSPECTIVE.

1. (U) In response to your request, the following comments on  
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Admiral Sharp's message of 212040Z March are provided.

2. (C) I agree with many of Admiral Sharp's criticisms. We have been reviewing the document with CIA in recent weeks to ascertain how it can more meaningfully evaluate the effects of the bombing. As a result of that review, the appraisal will henceforth be published on a quarterly basis. This should allow for a more meaningful trend analysis than has been possible in the monthly reports. Improvement in the areas mentioned by Admiral Sharp is anticipated. In addition, format changes are contemplated, including the modification of the tables criticized by CINCPAC, (which were included to satisfy the Secretary of Defense's requirements).

3. (C) It would be difficult to compare operational "Potential with Performance," as suggested by Admiral Sharp. We all agree that North Vietnam's capability has been greatly reduced by the bombing and this has been emphasized, but to speculate as to what might have been accomplished under different authorities would not be appropriate. His suggestion that we "Assess the Impact of the ROLLING THUNDER on the USSR-ChiCom Relationship" and add "What if" analyses do not seem germane to an objective intelligence appraisal.

1 Enclosure a/s (C-EYES ONLY)

DIA MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

# Memorandum

DATE: 17 JAN 1968

TO : O/DD/I [REDACTED]

FROM : DD/OER

SUBJECT: Joint DIA-CIA BDA Report

I talked to General Bob Taylor this morning to see if he had done anything further about restricting the distribution of the joint DIA-CIA BDA report. Bob said that he felt that further initiative was up to the DCI. He did tell me however that General Bob Gansberg, on Wheeler's Staff, has talked to Rostow about the report. Rostow's advice was to leave it alone until McNamara leaves and, at that time, take steps to put it out less frequently and to make it a better report.

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Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

Distribution:

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(17 Jan 68) 25X1

DISTRIBUTION LIST  
(CIA Internal)  
AN APPRAISAL OF THE BOMBING OF NORTH VIETNAM  
Prepared Jointly by CIA & DIA

11 January 1968

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10 JAN 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: CIA/DIA Joint BDA Monthly

1. On 4 January 1968, I met with the DDI and General Bob Taylor to discuss the joint BDA report. General Taylor had several unflattering comments to make about this report - its one sidedness, its narrow scope, and its failure to present a well rounded analysis. He acknowledged however that he was aware that the report was tailored specifically to the narrow requirements of the Secretary of Defense.

2. General Taylor seemed to object to the very wide dissemination this report received and feels that it should be disseminated on a selective basis. The DDI and I allowed that this presented no problem to us and pointed out to General Taylor that, contrary to his impression, the dissemination of the report was controlled by DIA. General Taylor indicated that he would hold discussions with DIA to see if the circulation of the next report could be cut down drastically.

3. General Taylor discussed some alternatives for the future of the report. It was clear that he and the military would like production of the report to cease completely. We agreed that this would not bother us provided that the joint report was not replaced by an independent DIA report. Consideration was also given to publishing it on a less frequent basis - quarterly or "when there is something to say." This alternative wasn't discussed in much detail other than to point out the difficulties we have had in the board meetings with DIA particularly when coordinating figures for a long period of time. Finally, General Taylor expressed hope, that, I am sure is shared by many in the Pentagon, that when a new Secretary of Defense comes in, it might be possible to discontinue the report.




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DD/OER  (10 Jan 68)

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6 DEC 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: Improvement of the DIA-CIA Monthly on Effects  
of Bombing

1. The recent regrettable but undoubtedly warranted criticism of the drafting of the joint monthly brings to a head the need to correct a bad situation in the drafting and coordination of this report. I have outlined the major problems to you particularly the scant opportunity for deliberate preparation and review of the DIA summary and the coordinated texts. This problem is most severe in the case of the transportation ~~of the~~ sections of the report for which both DIA and CIA prepare separate contributions. The marriage of these is always a bad union because the CIA interest is for a statement consistent with the McNamara reports and the DIA interest is in a statement emphasizing damage and disruption.


2. The following suggestions are offered as a program to resolve some of the problems associated with the joint report:

a. Return to the original scheduling of the project that allows a first coordinated draft to be completed early in the month, thus a more deliberate review by higher echelons in each agency and a more considered judgment of proposed changes.

b. Each party to prepare the summary statement for its contribution -- CIA-OCI-Political; DIA-Military; CIA, OER-Economic, including Transportation.

c. A second coordinating session by representatives of each Agency authorized to give final approval of a draft. (This to preclude the draft being returned to each Agency for another round of unilateral review.)

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d. The final agreed draft to be edited by the chief editor of the OER Publications Staff.



Chief  
International Research Area, ER

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Ch/I/ER:  (6 Dec 67)

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